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Until half a century ago or so, the sciences – at least the natural sciences, the
humanities and social sciences present problems to which I shall return – were
supposed by most philosophers and historians of science to be by their very
nature cumulative and progressive. They were in no need of anamnesis,
everything was retained straightaway (except mistakes, which could be safely
buried). The general public, though sometimes scared by the technological and
world-shaping outcome of the applications of science, still tends to think so. For
good reasons, we must admit. To the general public, the proof of the pudding
is the eating, and if we measure science by, say, the ability to predict the
trajectories of planets and spatial vehicles or the development of new antibiotics
(or to explain the mechanisms by which we make older ones inefficient), then
science does progress.
Whether science is cumulative turns out to be a different question, and this
is indeed where doubt set in around 1960 among philosophers of science – some
of those established as such, and most famous of all, a historian of science failing
to find linear progress and turning philosopher in the process of understanding
why, namely Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions from 1962,
and in a paper on “The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research”, presented
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in 1961 and published in 1963.1
What remained from Kuhn’s argument in general discourse was little more
than the term “paradigm” (rarely understood exactly as Kuhn intended it, but
even his usage was somewhat blurred) and perhaps the idea that successive
paradigms were “incompatible”, understood by critics more radically than
intended, and therefore emphasizing the non-cumulative character of scientific
practice even more strongly than Kuhn himself. His view on the matter was
summed up in the formulations that scientific development was Darwinian in
nature, “from more primitive beginnings but toward no goal”. This denial of
progress toward a goal named “truth” hinged on his identification of truth with
an ontology, a list of constituents of the world. In 1718, indeed, Stahl introduced
phlogiston – a material principle of combustion – as a means to bring order to
the multitude of combustion and reduction phenomena, and half a century later
Lavoisier pushed the same principle away in order to make place to oxygen;
Newton introduced the gravitational force as an explanation how the planetary
system works, and Einstein’s theory of General Relativity replaced it by the
geometrical properties of space itself. In both cases we do have steady progress
in the predictive power of the discipline, but speaking of steady improvement
of the ontology seems absurd.
Kuhn first meant “paradigm” to designate the “great book” (e.g., Ptolemy’s
Almagest or Newton’s Principia) – or, in more recent times, the standard set of
textbooks – on which everybody in a discipline is trained, and this is where
oblivion comes in. Training is indeed more than just accepting as true a set of
statements, as everybody knows who has thought about how you are trained
to swim, to run a bicycle or drive a car. Training reaches the level of your mind
which makes you (re)act without thinking about why you do so. In order to
understand why you act as you do on the foundation of training requires quasi-
Kantian critique, which is always difficult and slows down work – Newtonian
physicists never bothered much about Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Training,
however, is not necessarily cumulative: having been trained to drive a car, you
may certainly extend your training by trying to drive on ice; but beware not
to rely on your training in running a motorbike when starting car training –
better forget it for safety!
Now let us have a look at the dynamics Kuhn sees in scientific development
“from primitive beginnings but toward no goal” (I shall permit myself to present
1 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2Chicago, 1970, 11962. Idem, “The
Function of Dogma in Scientific Research”, pp. 347–369 in A. C. Crombie (ed.), Scientific
Change, London, 1963.
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a “creative” and evidently very brief version2). The starting point is a field of
interest – maybe (Kuhn’s example) electric phenomena, maybe “the situation
of women”. Initially there are almost as many approaches as there are workers,
nobody really understands why others are doing as they are, and there can be
little progress; this is the “pre-paradigmatic phase”. Then one approach seems
to hold particular promises, and others begin to emulate; Kuhn’s example is
Franklin’s theory of electricity and his experiments, in women’s studies of the
early 1970s Germaine Greer’s Female Eunuch had a similar role. This leads to
the second sense of “paradigm”: what you take over when being trained from a
particular book or textbook tradition: a set of classificatory and explanatory
concepts, methods and tricks of trade, expectations and norms as to what the
discipline should be interested in and how explanations ought to look, which
handbooks and journals are important, etc. This constitutes a discipline. The
elements of the paradigm are only in part learned from analytical explanation,
in part they are genuine skills learned from non-verbalized training; and even
that which is verbalized often has the character of values rather than rules that
can be followed strictly.3 Workers interested in the same real-life object but not
sharing the paradigm in this sense do not belong to the same discipline in the
epistemological sense, even though they may be employed at the same institute.
They may still be able to learn from each other, but with the same difficulty as
one learns from disciplines looking at different objects, through particular
spectacles.4
Once a paradigm in this sense has been established, systematic and
cumulative work can start. One worker’s results and questions can be taken over
by other workers, if needed questioned with understanding, because not only
explicit statements but all their connotations, conceptual presuppositions etc.
are shared. In this way, the explanatory power of the paradigm is exploited to
2 This “creative” interpretation is fully unfolded in my Human Sciences: Reappraising the
Humanities through History and Philosophy (Albany, New York: State University of New
York Press, 2000), pp. 277–394, passim.
3 Emphasis on training and on the guidance by values rather than rules are the two main
features that differentiate Kuhn’s approach from others with whom he is often compared.
This difference was rarely understood at the time – and in 1992 Kuhn himself had
forgotten (“The Trouble with the Historical Philosophy of Science”; History of Science
Department, Harvard University).
4 In order to qualify this statement one should observe that “the paradigm” is not made
of one piece: it is a nested structure. Some components of the training and scholarly norms
of a linguist are shared with literary scholars, others with psychologists, still others with
none of them.
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the full; gradually, the range of problems it has solved increases – Kuhn sees
the paradigm as an instrument for “puzzle solving”, and the paradigm itself
is sharpened as a tool in this process (it «accommodates»). But exactly because
it allows those who are well trained in the paradigm to anticipate which kind
of problems it allows to attack,5 it helps to shelve and forget other interests
which once were part of the inspiration for the field – once the paradigm of
comparative linguistics had put the study of etymologies on a more secure base
in the early nineteenth century, not only the methods used by the etymologist
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries but also the questions that had
occupied them came to be viewed as scholarly obscenities (as they still are today,
if they have not become historical curios).
At some moment, intractable anomalies begin to abound, problems which
the paradigm “promises” to be able to solve but which in fact resist understand-
ing. Systematic work under the paradigm has exhausted its possibilities, and
at the same time located the points rather precisely where it fails.6 The discipline
gets into a state of mild panic, the limits of the permissible widen, and the
situation begins to resemble that of the pre-paradigmatic phase – until one of
the swarm of innovative proposals has so much success that it serves to establish
a new paradigm which replaces the old one. The process repeats itself, and new
collective oblivion ensues, now hitting even the concepts and norms of the
previous paradigm. Those who then grow up with this paradigm and are trained
in it of course learn about the triumphs of their predecessors, but these triumphs
are now told in the terms of the present cognitive framework. If confronted with
original writings from before the “revolution” they tend to misunderstand what
these are speaking about and looking for. The two paradigms are, in Kuhn’s
word, “incompatible”, and understanding one from the standpoint of the other
is as translating from one language into another; workers under the new
5 In this respect, the doctoral advisor is supposed to embody the paradigm, knowing in
advance which problems should yield to good work, and which represent blind alleys
which it would be irresponsible to ask or encourage the student to take up.
6 In a passage from the Dialektik der Natur (MEW 20, 335f; as far as I know newer taken
up by the philosophers of science of the socialist countries), Engels already noticed this
dynamics: “In chemistry, only a century’s work according to the phlogistic theory supplied
the material which allowed Lavoisier to discover in the oxygen that Priestley had produced
the real counterpart of the imaginary phlogiston substance, and thus to throw over the
whole phlogiston theory”. Another “Kuhnian” observation is packed into the quotation:
Joseph Priestley produced oxygen, but understood it within the framework of the
phlogiston theory as “phlogiston-free air”; only Lavoisier “invented” oxygen, thus
engendering what developed into a new paradigm. Our ontology, the objects we see,
depend on our paradigm.
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paradigm, if not unusually attentive, tend to do so “naively”, falling into the
traps of “false friends” which any conscious translator knows so well.
This description is already highly abstract when we discuss the natural
sciences; no wonder (notwithstanding the reviewers’ amusement at the time)
that Kuhn, when entering into the thicket of historical details in a book from
1987 about Max Planck and the early history of quantum mechanics, did not
use the word “paradigm” a single time in its 400 pages. Within the humanities,
Kuhn’s picture may still give us some insights, but these will have to be thought
through and sifted cautiously – Kuhn already pointed out that in the humanities
training is not made from textbooks but from reading of original work, where
no one approach normally has the monopoly (perhaps not quite as true today,
but still a fairly adequate picture). In particular, we may think of the proliferation
of fields called “studies”: “English studies”, “Women’s studies”, “post-colonial
studies”, “queer studies”, “science studies”, etc. What these have in common
is to be defined from interest in some part of the external world, not through
anything like a paradigmatic approach. They are by nature pre-paradigmatic –
and since those who work in them usually already have a scholarly training,
inter-disciplinary. For a while, a particular approach may achieve almost
paradigmatic status – I mentioned The Female Eunuch – but as a rule, this
approach is not eventually replaced by a new one because its possibilities have
been exploited to the full, thereby creating an internal pressure for renewal and
alternative; in a more colourful terminology, it is not exploded from within.
Instead, it comes under attack because any particular approach tends to forget
and repress problems from the field which, at second thoughts or because of
a new political and socio-cultural situation, seem no less important than those
interesting the quasi-paradigmatic approach (for example, in the case of women’s
studies, questions of working and educational possibilities and legal restraints,
which Greer’s sexual emphasis had driven to the periphery). Often, to say it
crudely, changes of approach, interest and emphasis in the humanities tend to
depend even less on internal cognitive dynamics and even more on fashion or
adaption to external demands than in the natural sciences. That does not mean
that oblivion of earlier approaches does not take place in the “studies” fields.
However, since they were not created by a highly technicalized discipline, the
barriers for understanding them are lower. For workers in women’s studies
today, the difficulties in understanding Simone de Beauvoir’s Deuxième sexe will
at most be a combination of the difficulties encountered by her readers in the
year the book was written (1949) with those of reading any intellectual text from
that year at 60 years’ distance; such difficulties are quite different from those
of a young geneticist who tries to grasp what things are really about in a paper
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from a genetics journal from 1949. There is oblivion and oblivion.
Moreover: The oblivion of the geneticist may be necessary, in so far as skills
are better wielded when you do not need to reflect; when working on the
connection between sequences of amino acids in DNA strings, protein production
and genes, the geneticist should not be bothered by questions and fumbling
antedating the double helix and the cracking of the DNA-code – these would
only disturb working concepts. At least when training the next generation of
workers, it is important for efficiency not to teach all the meanings a concept
(etc.) has had in history – that is, everything it does not mean any longer.7
The worker in a non-paradigmatic field needs forgetfulness of preceding
approaches to the same extent and for the same reason as neglect of other
intellectual fields – one cannot be actively interested in everything without
becoming superficial.
On the other hand, both kinds of oblivion have a common effect: the field
may forget where it came from, and thereby perhaps sever the connection to
its roots in larger society. This does not necessarily happen, new roots or
legitimizations may also arise or be constructed; but the invective “purely
academic” illustrates the risk.
To sum up this first section: Science regarded as a depository of results
remains in progress, and even accumulative. No paradigm shift bereaves Watt’s
steam engine of its degree of efficiency, and successive paradigm formations
and paradigm shifts in thermodynamics and materials science have each
contributed to improve the efficiency of steam engines. But science as an
intellectual endeavour is not. By climbing on the shoulders of predecessors (giants
or otherwise), scientists transforms them into stone plinths or at best pretty
caryatids; past scientists are no dialogue partners.
–– 2 ––
Until the 1950s (often but not always in subsequent decades), history of science
supported the accumulative-progressive view of philosophers of science. Of
7 There may of course be other reasons for such cognitive repressions, more rooted in
institutional history than in epistemology. In the 1960s, it was impossible to make a thesis
on “intuitionist” philosophy in the Mathematical Institute of the University of Copenhagen,
since Harald Bohr – whose bust looked at everybody in the institute library – had belonged
to the opposite, “formalist” school. In the Niels Bohr Institute it was equally impossible
to have a serious interest in “hidden variables”, since this was at odds with Niels Bohr’s
“Copenhagen interpretation” of quantum mechanics.
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course it might present personal history, with or without integration into social,
institutional and cultural context and with or without integration with technology
(mostly without, it must be said). As a history of ideas, however, what it depicted
was the caryatids of contemporary science – what a Kepler or a Newton had
done was presented in modern formulae. If (say, but indeed true for both) they
had developed their thinking on the partial basis of ancient harmonics (musical
theory), that was at most mentioned as a curiosity, not explored; but mostly it
was not mentioned, being irrelevant to that accumulation of still relevant results
to which they had contributed.8 Paradoxically as that may seem, historiography
was thus a tool for oblivion – for the kind of oblivion inherent in the practice
of the science of its time. Yet the paradox is that of any court history, by nature
a justification of the present rule, and the history of science was largely written
from a perspective similar to that of a court historian. The court in question was
of course not that of political rule but that of prevailing science, and what was
produced was the picture of the professional past which could please or flatter
the practising scientist – “the royal road to me”, in a formulation which goes
back to my friend Ivor Grattan-Guinness but has since become a familiar jibe
among historians of science of a new breed.9
This new breed came, if not to dominate the field then at least to have some
importance from the 1970s onward. Their (better, “our” – I suppose I belong
to the race) hermeneutics is not that of Gadamer – his concept of Horizontver-
schmelzung from Wahrheit undMethode (according to which the present conceptual
world is a kind of fulfilment of the historical development and hence ultimately
the key in which the past should be read) is indeed a justification of the
traditional historiographic of science. Instead it tries to reconstruct the scientific
concepts of the past from the web of texts (scientific, but not only scientific) from
a particular epoch – to some extent following Wittgenstein’s principle “don’t
ask for the meaning, ask for the use”, at least trying to formulate past meanings
on the basis of past use, and trying to avoid importing present-day meanings
without being aware of it. We may call it “anamnestic”, since it tries to recover
memory of the past which had been repressed.
8 I have colleagues who might protest here and point to Alexandre Koyré as an exception.
To some extent at least, it is true, Koyré (a run-away theologian) rather transformed early
Modern science into a plinth for contemporary philosophy.
9 We may also apply Georg Lichtenberg’s aphorism: “Such works are mirrors. When a
monkey looks into them, no saint can stare back”.
Grattan-Guinness goes so far as to deny that what we are speaking of here be history,
classifying it instead as “heritage”. In that case, however, one may ask whether (for
example) Livy wrote history.
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At times those who make “anamnestic” history of science are as aware as
other humanists and as philosophers of history that what we can achieve is only
a reconstruction, an abstraction from which many aspects of the past have
disappeared, and which may even be mistaken in some of the aspects it retains.
They are also conscious that we can only reconstruct, that is, explain the past,
by making use of our own language and concepts: not naively, not by using
the concepts of actual scientific practice at face value, not by one-to-one mapping
between past and present concepts, but so to say network-to-network – but still
rooting our explanations (and the questions we ask to the past) in the world
we live in. Others seem to be blissfully ignorant of these paradoxes of the
historiographical endeavour (or at least write as if they were) and believe they
can tell the truth about the past “on its own conditions”, or to find out wie es
eigentlich gewesen, in the all-encompassing sense which is often attributed to Ranke
though it was not his – being just as convinced to be right as the workers under
the paradigm in one of the hard sciences and just as unable to understand other
approaches than their own.
Many factors have gone into the rise of this trend. One (but only one) is the
emergence of a professionalized environment. The pertinence and quality of the
work of a historian is judged in the first instance by other historians of science,
not by active scientists. A second instance judges the relevance of positions in
the history of science, and here practising scientists – or rather formerly practising
scientists who have climbed the administrative ladder – may have their say; but
this is a second instance, and a less powerful influence on the research style of
the single worker than the professional peers.
–– 3 ––
Given that (say) chemists have limited influence on how historians of science
approach the history of their field, we may ask what they get out of the
historians’ attempt to overcome their professional oblivion. A curing anamnesis?
Curing for what?
This seemingly simple question – like almost any seemingly simple question –
is a crystal with many faces. I shall reflect upon a few of them.
In the daily work of the practising scientist, the answer is that history (of
any kind) means little. Normal science is not trite routine; as lived by the
participant of course it involves much routine, but the moments of getting new
insight, new ideas, is felt to be what is important and distinguishes the
undertaking. However, these insights etc. are produced within the framework
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of the prevalent practice and mode of thought (“paradigm”), and here neither
the projection of these on the past nor views of the past which might cast doubt
on their absolute validity is of any help.
When crisis approaches, one might believe historical insight to have better
possibility to intervene. Not only is the amount of innovation greater;10 it is
also less constrained by the prevalent paradigm. Kuhn claimed indeed that one
of the things that characterize this situation is increased willingness to take up
past ideas. New ideas may certainly be inspired from anywhere, also by distorted
or less distorted versions of past theoretical structures. But they might as well
come from a fairy tale which impressed one as a child, from experience in the
kitchen. Newton’s falling apple is a lie, but nothing would prevent it from having
been true; Einstein, when writing his first paper on the Special Theory of
Relativity, might have been inspired from the discussion of the nature of time
in Aristotle’s physics – thoughts are developed in parallel for quite a while –
but he was not.11
Traditional history of science, like court history in general, had a different
function: legitimization of the present and its power relations. Historiographic
sensitivity to differences, the awareness that the past cannot be reduced to a less
developed version of the present but was a world on its own, makes
legitimization less straightforward. If we cannot claim that everything in the
past points toward us, then it seems less obvious that we are on the only possible
and therefore the right path.
That sensitivity to differences and acceptance of their legitimacy which
characterizes “anamnestic” history of science does not convey a message that
science progresses along the only possible road. This may displease scientists
less than it displeases those who disguise controversial activities as scientific
(and hence inescapable) progress or necessity – be it agriculture based on genetic
10 Even though much is still routine – if not, the new paradigm would not be created by
the workers in the field, since their professional routine would not count. In a beautiful
aphorism: “In normal science, 95% of everything is routine; during a scientific revolution,
only 90% is routine” (Donald T. Campbell, at the “Symposium on Evolutionary
Epistemology”, Ghent 1984).
11 I may add two personal confessions. My inspiration for the methods that allowed me
to crack the Old Babylonian mathematical terminology came (so I discovered a posteriori)
from guiding student projects about thematic analysis of novels, based on structuralist
methods; a particular Babylonian method I suddenly understood (and this time I knew
it at the moment, and it went into my naming of the trick) when applying a concept I
knew from my past in high energy physics. Both innovations drew on tools coming from
my professional cognitive past, as “new” ideas often do; but that is not the same as history,
in particular not as history which has only been studied but not lived intensely.
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manipulation, be it bombings calculated mathematically and hence claimed to
possess “surgical precision” because of their reliance of infallible mathematics.
It may also displease those who dismiss scientific results as “mere theory” or
science as a whole as “nothing but another belief system” when wanting to teach
Genesis as biology or to pump the atmosphere full of carbon dioxide.
“Anamnestic” history of science does not give us a picture of the scientific
endeavour as a military march along a straight line, nor however as blind groping
and random walk in all directions. Kuhn may show that Planck did not
understand the implications of what he was doing when he was taking the first
steps toward quantum mechanics; but Planck still provided a starting point for
what has since then been adopted by every physicist, though integrated in
different frameworks depending on whether they accept the “Copenhagen
interpretation” or not, and without which our computers and diode lights simply
would not have been made.
Working scientists thus cannot or can only accidentally take advantage of
history (of any kind) in their scientific practice. Many, of course, are not
interested in historical questions at all. Those who are, however, do not in general
react negatively to the “anamnestic” style. They may disagree with particular
interpretations, and they may have good reasons – interpretations are always
under discussion, so this is a different matter than disagreement with the
undertaking as such. What they get at the personal level may be a richer feeling
of professional identity. What the profession gets is an opportunity that its
members reflect once more upon their role and upon the relation between what
they are actually doing and what were the extra-scientific concerns from which
the discipline started once, members more conscious of the responsibility of the
discipline and the scientific enterprise in general. Anthropology and cognate
disciplines may serve as an example: the appearance of Edward Said’s Orientalism
in 1978 had a strong impact on many members. Recent work on the
intertwinement between the development of nineteenth-century (French, but not
only French) anthropology and the effort of the colonial powers to “divide and
rule” by sharpening whatever ancient ethnic conflicts could be identified within
the submitted populations at least deserves the same – and might sharpen the
awareness of the profession of its use for similar purposes today. So, if history
of science while overcoming its traditional role of celebrational court history does
not become a “purely academic” concern itself which has lost sight of its original
aspirations, then it may contribute to producing academics who are more
responsible citizens, both of the république des savants and of the république tout
court.
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I shall close my talk with some observations concerning the field where much
of my own work over the years has been made: the history (and once, the
didactics) of mathematics.
Together with medicine, mathematics is probably the academic field which
has the strongest tradition for interest in its own history, and which most often
pays for positions for historians within its own institutes.
In contrast to medicine, which has had no difficulty in recognizing at least
the major revolutions in its history and points to these as triumphs (such as the
rejection of the Galenic bodily humours and the miasma theory), mathematics
has a long tradition for seeing itself as a discipline in steady progress, always
keeping what it has once brought under its dominion. In the 1970s, after the
impact of Kuhn’s work on scientific revolutions, this was held out as what
distinguished mathematics from other field; mathematics, thus we may interpret
the view, never errs, and therefore never had to retract – it just learns more and
more, and orders its knowledge better and better.
In the meantime, historians of mathematics have refuted this view, as it turns
out without creating excessive scandal among mathematicians. None the less,
just as in the case of the physical sciences there is something alluring in the old
view – we may still recognize mathematics in papyri and clay tablets from the
Bronze Age, and crack their procedures by means of (the simplest level of) the
mathematics of our own days – which means that they are somehow valid in
the same sense. I shall not try to discuss why this is so (it is probably just as
impossible to state the answer exactly as in the case of the physical sciences)
nor claim that it is the full truth (much of my own work on Mesopotamian
mathematics has aimed to show that it is not). What is important for our present
discussion is the impact of this continuity in teaching.
Nobody would teach medical students the Galenic theory of humours, neither
in the original nor in some updated version, and nobody would do anything
similar with the phlogiston theory in school chemistry. On this account,
mathematics is much more akin to literary theory and historiography. One may
base an introductory university course of text analysis on the principles of
Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics, and one may even use the original texts (a
colleague of mine did so a few years ago – evidently in translation and not in
ancient Greek). It is also natural to confront those who undertake the study of
history with Herodotos, Thukydides and Livy – three wonderfully contrasting
historiographic models. School mathematics does not act so radically (nor would
anybody base pre-university teaching of literature and history on the ancient
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authors), but there is still a high degree of continuity. When I was 14, I was not
only confronted with a slightly updated version of Euclidean geometry but also
with the whole range of topics from commercial arithmetic which I have now
encountered in my work on Italian “abbacus school” mathematics from the late
Middle Ages (my algebra, however, made use of the letter formalism created
in the seventeenth century). Until the nineteenth century, reform movements
in mathematics education often returned to Euclid’s Elements, at least books I–VI,
as the best basis (while the next reform movement kicked him out again – “À
bas Euclide, plus de triangles”, in Dieudonné’s dramatic words from 1960).
The historian’s traditional task at the mathematical institute has therefore
not only been to write court history, to describe “the royal road to us”, but also,
perhaps mainly, to give some kind of inspiration to the teaching endeavour. Some
didacticians have even believed in the “genetic method”, the pedagogical version
of Haeckel’s law (individual development resumes historical evolution), and
thus held that children should develop mathematical conceptual structures in
the same order as they have arisen historically; others were less radical, but many
still thought history might be a good wall against which to throw the ball.
Literal belief in the genetic method presupposed unacknowledged oblivion,
oblivion not only of the different conceptual structures by which past mathemat-
ics was carried but also lack of awareness that something has been forgotten.
Anamnesis might really be needed, it seems. It probably is – but it result is
somehow catastrophic. While showing that past conceptualizations were different
from ours, it also makes us see how these drew on experience which is no longer
ours, and in particular not those of modern school children, and were limited
by lack of kinds of experience which our children have encountered already
before starting school. This shows the futility of the strict version of the genetic
method, it makes it clear that it is a Lichtenberg mirror.
But anamnestic history may still be useful for didactics. Firstly, it may teach
didacticians something about how the construction of conceptual structures are
conditioned by the experiential world of the learners. Secondly, if its results are
communicated to teachers and children, it may broaden their view of what
mathematics is and what it could be. Some fifteen years ago, I had written a
short paper on the notion of “broad lines”, an idea of lines carrying an implicit
breadth (permitting a measurement of areas and lengths by the same unit just
as we measure cloth in length units because the breadth is given), and showing
that this idea was widespread in early practical geometry. The Italian journal
editor to whom I sent it later told me that he was to make a lecture in a middle
school the day after he had received it, and chose to tell about these broad lines.
“The children enjoyed it. They were enthusiastic that mathematics could be
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thought in a different way than the teacher said”.
Mathematics is certainly a field where the joy of discovery on the part of
the learner is mostly supposed never to go beyond what the teacher already
knows, and anamnestic history may therefore be an eye-opener, a support for
tolerance. I am not convinced a priori that mathematics is the only field like this.
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